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Metacognitive research aims to explain how people regulate their effort when performing cognitive 
tasks, to expose conditions that support reliable monitoring of chance for success, and to provide a 
basis for developing improvement guidelines. The essence of the domain is that monitoring drives 
control: people continually self-assess their chance for success before, during, and after performing 
a cognitive task, and use these judgments to guide their effort-allocation decisions (e.g., whether to 
reconsider an answer option, change strategy, seek help, or give up). Thus, factors that underlie 
metacognitive judgments affect the efficiency with which people perform cognitive tasks. This 
paper focuses on meta-reasoning – the monitoring and control processes that apply to reasoning, 
problem-solving, and decision-making tasks. So far, relatively little is known about heuristic cues 
used for inferring meta-reasoning judgments. This paper reviews the known heuristic cues and offers 
methodological guidelines for a critical reading of existing research and for designing high-quality 
studies that will advance this important domain. 
 







Performing cognitive tasks, such as problem solving or text learning, requires 
activation of various cognitive operations for each task item (e.g., solving each in a 
series of puzzles, or studying a paragraph within a lengthy text). These operations 
include retrieval of relevant prior knowledge, representation of the various task 
components, and whatever specific steps (e.g., induction, deduction, abstraction, 
application of quantitative rules, memory retrieval, etc.) are required for the given 
task (Butler & Winne, 1995). Performing such tasks also involves a parallel set of 
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metacognitive processes, including setting a goal for each item, monitoring progress 
toward that goal, and directing one's effort in accordance (see Ackerman & 
Thompson, 2017a; Bjork, Dunlosky, & Kornell, 2013, for reviews). The 
metacognitive research approach within cognitive psychology, focuses on exposing 
bases for people's monitoring and the actions taken in response in terms of effort 
allocation and time management (e.g., deciding to reconsider an answer, change 
strategy, seek help, or cease investing effort).  
Monitoring can be expressed by many types of judgments, which people are 
assumed to make spontaneously before, during, and after performance of any 
cognitive task. These judgments include an initial judgment of whether the task is 
doable, followed by assessments of initial outcomes, ongoing progress, and the 
chance for success of a chosen response. The basic principle is that monitoring drives 
control over effort allocation (Nelson & Narens, 1990). For example, judgments of 
learning (JOLs) provided after memorizing words were found to be causally related 
to restudy choices (Metcalfe & Finn, 2008). In math exercises (12×14=?), feeling of 
knowing (FOK) about the exercise's components guided attempts to retrieve a known 
solution (Reder & Ritter, 1992). Feeling of rightness (FOR), a judgment that applies 
to initial intuitive solutions (the solution that jumps to mind), was found to be 
associated with reconsideration time and likelihood of changing the solution 
(Thompson, Prowse Turner, & Pennycook, 2011). Initial judgments of solvability 
assessing whether Raven Matrices are solvable (vs. mixed figures without underlying 
rules) provided after a brief glance in the matrices, were found to predict the time 
people invest later in attempting the problems, above and beyond other potential cues 
(Lauterman & Ackerman, in press). Similarly, confidence was found to predict 
information-seeking in decision-making contexts (Desender, Boldt, & Yeung, 2018). 
Thus, as long as the relevant judgment is reliable, people have a solid basis for 
making effective control decisions (that is, decisions regarding effort allocation). 
Unreliable judgments lead to bad decisions (see Bjork et al., 2013, for a review). For 
instance, people who feel overconfident when performing a challenging task are 
likely to cease investing effort too early, when in fact they should attempt to improve 
their chance for success by allocating more time to the task (e.g., Ackerman & 
Goldsmith, 2011).  
Metacognitive judgments are known to be based on heuristic cues (Koriat, 
1997; see Dunlosky & Tauber, 2014 for a review). That is, people cannot directly 
"read" the quality of their own cognitive processing, but instead apply cue utilization 
– they base their metacognitive judgments on information drawn from the task, the 
environment, or their own subjective experience. Based on these heuristic cues 
people infer their own chance for success at any given moment. The predictive 
accuracy of metacognitive judgments depends on cue diagnosticity – the diagnostic 
value of the heuristic cues that underlie them.  
Most research dealing with heuristic cues for judgments has been done with 
memorization and knowledge retrieval tasks, under the meta-memory research 
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domain (e.g., Koriat, 2012; Metcalfe & Finn, 2008), and with learning from texts, 
under the meta-comprehension research domain (see Wiley et al., 2016, for a 
review). In recent years, a growing body of literature has begun to consider the 
heuristic cues which underlie metacognitive monitoring in the context of reasoning, 
problem solving, and decision making, under the meta-reasoning framework 
(Ackerman & Thompson, 2015, 2017a, 2017b). While most principles are common 
across task domains, some heuristic cues have been found to affect metacognitive 
judgments differently across domains (e.g., effects of font readability on 
metacognitive judgments in reasoning, Thompson, Prowse Turner et al., 2013; vs. in 
memorizing, Undorf, Söllner, & Bröder, 2018; Undorf & Zimdahl, 2019). In this 
review I focus on the meta-reasoning context.  
A wide-angle view of the metacognitive literature suggests three levels of 
heuristic cues for metacognitive judgments (see Box 1). Classic meta-memory 
research has focused mostly on the last level – people's momentary subjective 
experience when encountering each item (e.g., a word pair to be memorized). 
Bringing to the fore the other two levels highlights that people are quite sophisticated 
in integrating self-perceptions and task characteristics in their judgments, along with 
a variety of momentary experiences (e.g., Bajšanski, Žauhar, & Valerjev, in press; 
Koriat, Ma'ayan, & Nussinson, 2006; Thompson, Pennycook, Trippas, & Evans, 
2018; Undorf et al., 2018). This complex inference process seems to develop 
throughout childhood and matures only towards adulthood (Koriat, Ackerman, Adiv, 
Lockl, & Schneider, 2014; van Loon, Destan, Spiess, de Bruin, & Roebers, 2017). 
 
Level 1: Self-Perceptions 
 
Self-perceptions refer to a person's beliefs about his/her own traits, abilities, or 
knowledge, either in general or with respect to a given task type or domain. For 
example, test anxiety and math anxiety derive from self-doubt about a particular task 
type (test-taking) or domain (mathematics), respectively, regardless of the particular 
task one might face at a given moment (e.g., Morsanyi, Busdraghi, & Primi, 2014). 
Another example is need for cognition, which reflects the extent to which a person 
enjoys (or dislikes) effortful cognitive activities (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982). Data 
regarding self-perceptions are typically collected through self-report questionnaires.  
One important aspect of self-perceptions is confidence in one's ability to succeed at 
a given task. In metacognitive research, meta-reasoning included, the main approach 
to assessing confidence is through item-level confidence ratings (i.e., one or more 
ratings collected for each item in a task), rather than through self-reported confidence 
about a global task type or domain, as the detailed confidence guides effort allocation 
for each item, as reviewed above. The means of item-level confidence across items 
(e.g., exam questions) can be calculated to produce an overall appraisal of a person's 
item-level confidence when performing a task. Overall confidence assessed in this 
way has been found to be associated with various self-perceptions (math anxiety, 
Legg & Locker, 2009; analytic-thinking disposition, Pennycook, Ross, Koehler, & 
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Fugelsang, 2017; self-reported thinking style, Prowse Turner & Thompson, 2009; 
English, math, academic, and memory self efficiency and self concepts, Stankov, 
Lee, Luo, & Hogan, 2012) and is accounted a stable trait (Jackson & Kleitman, 2014; 
Stankov, Kleitman, & Jackson, 2014). Notably, though, recent findings with 
perceptual, knowledge, reasoning, and emotion identification tasks suggest that the 
discrimination between correct and wrong responses is more malleable than the 
global confidence and overconfidence levels, especially when considering 
experimental designs in which each individual performs particularly diverse tasks 
(Ais, Zylberberg, Barttfeld, & Sigman, 2016; Dentakos, Saoud, Ackerman, & 
Toplak, in press). 
 
 
Box 1. Levels of Heuristic Cues for Metacognitive Judgments 
A review of the metacognitive literature reveals three levels of cues for metacognitive 
judgments and interactions among them: 
Level 1: Self-perceptions 
Overall assessment of one’s own qualities in a given task domain. 
Examples: 
 "I am good/bad at this type of task" 
 "I have a good/bad memory for details" 
 Domain knowledge (e.g., level of expertise) 
 Relevant acknowledged personality traits (e.g., test anxiety, need for 
cognition). 
Level 2: Task characteristics 
Information and beliefs about factors affecting performance in a task as a whole. 
Examples: 
 Test type (e.g., open-ended vs. multiple-choice test format, memory for 
details vs. high-order comprehension) 
 Time frame (pressured vs. loose) 
 Environment (e.g., computer vs. paper, indoors vs. outdoors, home vs. 
classroom) 
 With/without training or feedback 
 Instructions (e.g., emphasizing speed vs. accuracy) 
Level 3: Momentary experiences  
Item-level indications of chance for success based on momentary subjective 
experience before, during, and after attempting any task item (e.g., answering a 
question in an exam). 
Examples:  
Fluency (perceived ease of processing), consensuality, accessibility, cardinality, 
familiarity, concreteness, coherence, pronounceability 
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A consistent finding across many studies and methodologies is that lower 
achievers tend to be less confident than higher achievers. However, lower achievers 
typically do not acknowledge just how low is their actual success rate, meaning that 
their confidence should in fact be even lower. Consequently, lower achievers are 
more overconfident than higher achievers (see Figure 1 for an example). The greater 
overconfidence of lower achievers compared to higher achievers is a manifestation 
of the classic Dunning-Kruger effect (see Pennycook et al., 2017). Identifying the 
heuristic cues that lead lower achievers astray is an intriguing and important focus of 
metacognitive research that so far is understudied (e.g., Ehrlinger, Johnson, Banner, 
Dunning, & Kruger, 2008). 
 
 
Figure 1. Example of the Dunning-Kruger effect, adapted from Pennycook et al. (2017). The 
graph shows participants' estimated and actual accuracy in an 8-item reasoning test (a 
variation of the Cognitive Reflection Test, or CRT) as a function of correct answers per 
participant. 
 
From a methodological perspective, mean confidence judgments based on item-
level ratings have a number of uses in metacognitive research. When item-level 
confidence ratings are collected on Likert scales (e.g., 1 = sure to be wrong, 7 = 
absolutely confident), they can be used to compare mean confidence across 
conditions or groups (e.g., Thompson et al., 2018). Likert scales also allow 
examining correlations between various responses of the same individual and across 
individuals (e.g., Stupple, Ball, & Ellis, 2013). More precise confidence ratings, such 
as those collected as a percentage (0-100% confidence) or ratio (e.g., number of items 
judged to be correct relative to the total number of items), allow comparisons 
between mean confidence and actual success rates (e.g., Pennycook et al., 2017; Sidi, 
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Shpigelman, Zalmanov, & Ackerman, 2017). Such absolute ratings by percentage or 
ratio allow examining calibration in terms of over- and underconfidence.  
 
Level 2: Task Characteristics 
 
The second set of cues is information about characteristics of the tasks (see 
examples in Box 1). These characteristics may affect performance or may be unduly 
thought to affect it. Notably, people tend to under- or overestimate these 
characteristics' effect on performance based on naïve theories (Mueller & Dunlosky, 
2017). For instance, when people are allowed first-order experience of solving a task 
before being asked to assess their chance for success, they tend to pay more attention 
to item-level cues and underestimate the effect of task characteristics on their 
performance in both memory (recognition vs. recall test format; Touron, Hertzog, & 
Speagle, 2009) and reasoning contexts (open ended vs. multiple choice test format, 
Ackerman & Zalmanov, 2012, see more details and Figure 2 below; solving 
syllogisms with vs. without training, Prowse Turner & Thompson, 2009). We can 
see that it is the presence of item-level cues which interferes with cues based on task 
characteristics, because the latter have a stronger effect when participants provide 
judgments without an opportunity to attempt the tasks themselves (e.g., when 
assessing the difficulty of finding an answer presented by others) than when they can 
use their first-order experience (Kelley & Jacoby, 1996; Mitchum & Kelley, 2010).  
In one line of research, Ackerman and colleagues (Ackerman & Lauterman, 2012; 
Sidi et al., 2017) examined two task characteristics in both text learning and problem-
solving tasks: time frame (working under time pressure versus a loose time frame) 
and medium (encountering the task on a computer screen versus on paper). They 
found that on paper participants performed equally well in both time frames (with 
and without time pressure), while participants working on screens performed as well 
only under free time regulation. Success rates for participants working on screen 
under time pressure were significantly lower than in all other conditions (see 
Delgado, Vargas, Ackerman, & Salmerón, 2018, for a meta-analysis that shows this 
pattern to be robust). Notably, however, the interactive effect of time frame and 
medium on performance was not reflected in participants' metacognitive judgments. 
Overall, the judgments were a little lower under time pressure relative to free time, 
regardless of the actual performance difference between the time frames; and the 
metacognitive judgments did not capture the performance difference between the 
media under time pressure. Similar findings were reported by Shynkaruk and 
Thompson (2006), this time for a within-participant effect of time frame on 
confidence ratings. In their study, with syllogistic reasoning tasks, judgments 
provided under pressure to provide the first solution that came to mind were lower 
than later confidence ratings provided after participants could think freely, regardless 
of the extent of actual improvement in success rates between the two response stages.  
As these examples show, some task characteristics, like time frame, affect the 
perceived difficulty of the task, while others, like test format, going through training, 
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and the presentation medium, do not. Future research is called for to clarify which 
conditions people adequately take into account and which they ignore despite effects 
on performance. 
 
Level 3: Momentary Experience 
 
As mentioned above, the vast majority of meta-memory research dealing with 
heuristic cues for metacognitive judgments has focused on momentary subjective 
experiences that provide cues for item-level judgments. Yet, even with itemized 
judgments, there is room to consider which cues are theory-based, guided by people's 
beliefs regarding characteristics of the stimulus, and which cues are experience-
based, and guided by gut feeling (Koriat, 1997; Mueller & Dunlosky, 2017; Undorf 
& Erdfelder, 2015).  
A prominent experience-based heuristic cue in both meta-memory and meta-
reasoning research is processing fluency – the subjective ease with which a cognitive 
task is performed. Processing fluency is typically measured by response time, and its 
utilization is indicated by a negative correlation between time and judgments. 
Overall, processing fluency is a valid cue for success (e.g., Koriat et al., 2006; see 
Unkelbach & Greifeneder, 2013, for a review). When solving an easy problem, 
people can come up with the right solution quickly and feel highly confident that 
their solution is correct. When facing a challenging problem, though, in many cases 
the chance for success remains low despite investing a lot of effort, and people 
acknowledge this in their confidence ratings, as found across domains (e.g., 
Ackerman & Zalmanov, 2012; Blissett, Sibbald, Kok, & van Merrienboer, 2018; 
Fernandez-Cruz, Arango-Muñoz, & Volz, 2016). Even feeling of rightness – a 
metacognitive judgment regarding initial intuitive answers that come to mind quickly 
– has been found to reliably reflect processing fluency (e.g., Thompson, Evans, & 
Campbell, 2013; Thompson, Prowse Turner et al., 2013).  
The fact that negative time–judgment correlations are consistent across various 
research domains has been interpreted as indicating that fluency is a ubiquitous cue. 
However, this consistency does not rule out alternative explanations for the observed 
patterns. Ackerman (2014) suggested the Diminishing Criterion Model (DCM) as an 
alternative explanation for the negative time–judgment correlations. She called 
attention to the fact that fluency is a bottom-up inference process, whereby people 
first invest effort and then infer from the amount of effort already invested their 
chance for success at any given point (Koriat et al., 2006). According to the DCM, 
in contrast, people regulate their effort in a goal-driven manner, aiming to achieve a 
satisfactory chance for success (see Nelson & Narens, 1990). However, as they invest 
longer in each item, they compromise on their target level of confidence (that is, the 
level of confidence at which they will cease to invest effort). Thus, by the DCM, 
compromise generates the negative correlation between response time and 
judgments. This explanation does not rule out fluency as a heuristic cue altogether, 
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but suggests a combination of bottom-up inference and top-down regulation, which 
cannot be easily differentiated. In particular, Undorf and Ackerman (2017) found 
that the negative time-judgment correlation is limited to relatively high confidence 
levels (50-100%), while people invest a similar amount of time across all low levels 
of confidence (0-50%). According to the DCM, people stop when getting to a time 
limit, beyond which they are not willing to invest any further effort. Thus, it is 
possible that fluency have more effect when people feel knowledgeable and less so 
when they feel unconfident about their performance. This possibility deserves 
attention by future research. 
Beyond response time, a number of other heuristic cues that predict confidence 
also have bearing on ease of processing. Memory research has found confidence to 
be positively correlated with three cues: consensuality of answers – the level of 
agreement across participants (Koriat, 2008); self-consistency – the consistency of 
the evidence supporting each answer option (Koriat, 2012); and accessibility – the 
number of associations that come to mind when answering a question. Confidence is 
also negatively correlated with cardinality – the number of considered answer 
options (Jackson, 2016). Meta-reasoning research supports and extends these 
findings. For instance, Bajšanski et al. (in press) found both consistency and 
cardinality to predict confidence in syllogistic reasoning tasks, even after controlling 
for response time. Similarly, Ackerman and Beller (2017), using solvable and 
unsolvable problems, found initial judgment of solvability to be associated with 
accessibility even after controlling for response time. Thus, although many cues are 
clearly associated with ease of processing, they often make a contribution beyond 
affecting processing speed. 
A great deal of work has been done to identify conditions under which heuristic 
cues mislead judgments, and to expose factors that affect success rates but are not 
reflected in metacognitive judgments. To expose such biases, researchers triangulate 
confidence and accuracy with a measure that points to the heuristic cue under study. 
In the study mentioned above, Ackerman and Zalmanov (2012) had some 
participants solve problems using an open-ended test format, in which they had to 
type in their answer, while others solved the same problems using a multiple-choice 
test format, in which they had to choose the answer among four alternatives. 
Ackerman and Zalmanov triangulated confidence and accuracy with response time, 
as a measure of processing fluency (see another example of such triangulation in 
Shynkaruk & Thompson, 2006). A multiple-choice test format offers greater chances 
for success than an open-ended test format because solvers benefit from the 
opportunity to carefully consider each alternative, to recognize the correct answer 
when they see it, or even just to guess successfully; and as expected, solvers using 
that format had higher overall success rates. Ackerman and Zalmanov found that for 
all participants, confidence in each item was correlated with response time, 
presumably reflecting processing fluency. However, confidence ratings did not 
reflect the overall success rate difference between the test formats (see Figure 2). 
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Thus, as described earlier, test format was under-used as a cue for confidence 
judgments. This finding is in line with meta-memory findings that judgments of 
learning do not reflect appreciation of mnemonic methods that improve recall (e.g., 
imagining the memorized words, Rabinowitz, Ackerman, Craik, & Hinchley, 1982). 
 
 
Figure 2. Confidence and probability of correct solution in an extended version of the 
Cognitive Reflection Test (see supplementary materials for Ackerman, 2014) presented in an 
open-ended or multiple-choice test format. Adapted from Ackerman and Zalmanov (2012). 
 
Even more striking are findings indicating that people utilize heuristic cues 
which are in fact irrelevant for the task at hand. Topolinski (2014) reviewed a line of 
research in which participants were presented with word triads, of which half were 
solvable compound remote associates (CRAs) and half were random collections of 
three words. In a solvable CRA problem the answer is a common word that generates 
a compound word or phrase with each of the three (e.g., for the triplet FOOD – 
FORWARD – BREAK the correct answer is FAST, generating FAST FOOD, FAST 
FORWARD, and BREAKFAST). Participants had to decide quickly whether a word 
triad was coherent (solvable) or not. Topolinski and his colleagues (e.g., Topolinski 
& Strack, 2009) found that participants were more likely to judge words associated 
with positive affect as solvable, although the words' affective value was not 
associated with their solvability.  
Misleading heuristic cues can lead metacognitive monitoring astray to the point 
where heuristic-based judgments and effects on success rates are in opposite 
directions. Topolinski, Bakhtiari, and Erle (2016) presented to participants solvable 
anagrams (scrambled words) and unsolvable letter sets which could not be 
rearranged to form a valid word, and manipulated their pronounceability. For 
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instance, the word EPISODE was turned into the pronounceable anagram EDISEPO 
and the less pronounceable IPSDEOE; similar alternatives were created for the 
unsolvable letter sets. As expected, easy-to-pronounce anagrams were rated as 
solvable more often than hard-to-pronounce anagrams, for both solvable and 
unsolvable anagrams. This finding is particularly interesting because in reality 
anagrams which are easier to pronounce are harder to solve, and indeed showed 
lower success rates, since people find it more difficult to rearrange the letters (Novick 
& Sherman, 2008). Thus, pronounceability is a misleading heuristic cue for 
metacognitive judgments. 
Ackerman and Beller (2017) also used solvable CRA problems and random 
word triads. For each word in the triads, they used the number of compound words 
or two-word phrases in the language as an index for the heuristic cue of accessibility 
(Koriat, 1995). They then controlled for accessibility by balancing accessibility of 
the included words across solvable and unsolvable sets of problems, thereby making 
the frequency at which words create compounds or phrases an irrelevant cue for 
judging solvability. Notably also, the number of associations existing for a given 
word is not indicative of whether it shares a common association with the two words 
presented alongside it. CRA items containing words with a large number of 
associations on average across the three words are in fact harder to solve, rather than 
easier, because incorrect associations are more difficult to discount (in a manner 
similar to the effect of pronounceability on the difficulty of anagrams). Indeed, high-
accessibility CRAs show lower success rates than low-accessibility CRAs. 
Nevertheless, Ackerman and Beller's participants judged problems containing words 
with high accessibility as more likely to be solvable than those where accessibility 
for all three words was low. Thus, unlike in memory contexts, accessibility of word 
triads is a misleading heuristic cue which is not only not indicative of solvability, but 
at odds with actual difficulty of the word triad. 
Most of the heuristic cues considered in meta-memory and meta-reasoning 
research are based on semantic knowledge activated in verbal tasks, as is the case 
with pronounceability and accessibility of relevant knowledge reviewed above. 
Studying heuristic cues that affect performing non-verbal tasks provides 
opportunities to consider other types of heuristic cues. In a study by Boldt, De 
Gardelle, and Yeung (2017), participants judged the average color of an array of eight 
colored shapes and rated confidence in their choice. The greater the variability of 
colors across the eight shapes, the lower participants' confidence in their choice of 
the average color, even after controlling for the actual difficulty of the task. Reber, 
Brun, and Mitterndorfer (2008) found that symmetry was used as a heuristic cue 
when participants were asked to provide quick intuitive judgments about the 
correctness of dot-pattern addition equations. Lauterman and Ackerman (in press) 
manipulated original Raven Matrices to have unsolvable versions, by mixing the 
elements within each matrix, so to break the rules in the lines and columns. They 
presented participants a mixture of solvable and unsolvable matrices, balanced for 
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the original difficulty of each matrix. Participants had to judge quickly (4 seconds) 
whether the matrix is solvable in the first phase and to attempt solving in the second 
phase. This initial judgment of solvability, reported above to be predictive of later 
solving attempts, was associated with the original difficulty of the Raven Matrix, 
although, in fact, these two matrix characteristics, solvability and original difficulty, 
were unrelated. Thus, people utilize misleading heuristic cues in visual tasks as they 
do in verbal tasks. 
In sum, metacognitive judgments are prone to predictable biases which stem 
from utilizing heuristic cues that are generally valid even in cases where these 
particular cues are misleading. Understanding what factors people take into account 
when making metacognitive judgments is important for knowing which conditions 
allow more attuned judgments and for guiding improvement attempts. 
 
Methodologies for Exposing Heuristic Cues 
 
Exposing a potential heuristic cue starts with proposing a factor that is expected 
to underlie a metacognitive judgment. The review above included some examples of 
heuristic cues (see Box 1). The findings, mentioned above, that people integrate 
multiple heuristic cues in complex ways (e.g., Bajšanski et al., in press; Undorf et al., 
2018) hint that many cues are yet to be discovered.  
A number of methodologies have been used to examine whether a suggested 
factor underlies a metacognitive judgment. Here I present the three main approaches 
emerging from the literature (see Box 2). 
The main difference between methods aimed primarily at exposing valid cues 
(Method A) and methods useful for exposing biasing cues (Method B and Method 
C) is that the latter generate a dissociation between – or reveal that a given factor has 
a differential effect on – judgments and performance. This is of high importance, 
because when a judgment reflects performance differences reliably, it is impossible 
to identify with certainty a particular factor that generates this reliability. For this 
reason, Method A is the weakest of the three methodologies discussed here. In 
contrast, when judgments deviate from performance in a predictable manner, with 
an identifiable factor associated with the differential effect (Method B and Method 
C), we can draw stronger conclusions as to the contribution (or lack thereof) of this 
factor to the judgment. However, alternative factors that might also correlate with the 
bias must be considered and ruled out. I demonstrate each method by reviewing 
various examples, most of which have already been mentioned above.  
Method A can be illustrated with findings that feeling of rightness, feeling of 
error, and confidence judgments are typically negatively correlated with response 
time (Fernandez-Cruz et al., 2016; Koriat et al., 2006; Thompson, Prowse Turner et 
al., 2013). Important for the current discussion is that in all these cases there are also 
negative correlations between actual success rates and response time. The negative 
time–judgment correlations are interpreted as pointing to fluency (operationalized as 
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response time) as a heuristic cue for the judgments. However, such findings mainly 
reflect differences in difficulty between items, which in turn can stem from numerous 
characteristics that influence judgments through various cues, some of them 




In the study by Ackerman and Zalmanov (2012) reviewed above, the 
relationships between fluency (operationalized as response time), confidence 
judgments, and success were tested for two test formats, multiple choice and open-
ended. Thus, this study illustrates Method B. As described above, confidence in 
problem solutions dropped with time to a similar extent in both test formats (see 
Figure 2). However, there was an important difference in the validity of fluency in 
terms of actual success rates. Response time was a valid cue for the multiple-choice 
test format, where success rates dropped with time at the same rate as the confidence 
judgments, but not for the open-ended format, where no association was found 
between response time and chance for success: participants facing the open-ended 
format had a constant 40% success rate in all problems, both those where they 
responded quickly and those where they responded after lengthy thinking. Thus, this 
Box 2. Approaches to Identifying Heuristic Cues  
A review of the metacognitive literature reveals three main approaches to exposing 
heuristic cues for metacognitive judgments. The methods are presented in order from 
the weakest to the most convincing, and with reference to whether the method is best 
suited to exposing a valid cue (Method A) or a biasing cue (Methods B and C).   
Method A 
Main objective: To expose a valid cue.  
Approach: Identifying an association between different levels of the suggested factor 
and the judgment under investigation, in line with its effect on performance. 
Method B 
Main objective: To test utilization of a cue by exposing a bias in relation to particular 
task types or task items.  
Approach: Showing that a factor differentially affects judgments and objective 
performance. The identifying characteristic of Method B is using different task items 
for each level of the examined factor. 
Method C 
Main objective: To test utilization of a cue by exposing a bias using identical task 
items.  
Approach: Showing through manipulations of the examined factor that different 
levels of the factor differentially affect judgments and objective performance for the 
same items. 
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study showed that confidence drops with time regardless of the actual association 
between solving time and chance for success. This is more convincing evidence 
suggesting that people utilize fluency as a cue for confidence than when judgment 
and success rates are affected similarly by the examined factor in all conditions. 
Ackerman and Zalmanov (2012) interpreted the literally identical pattern of time–
confidence relationships in the two test formats as suggesting that people 
underestimate the effect of test format on their results and utilize fluency blindly, 
showing overgeneralization, even when fluency is not indicative of performance.  
The weakness of Method B, demonstrated here by Ackerman and Zalmanov's 
(2012) study, stems from the pronounced effects of task difficulty on judgment 
accuracy. An alternative to the fluency effect as an explanation for the findings of 
Ackerman and Zalmanov (2012) with respect to the multiple-choice format is that 
the association between time and success rates reflects the greater ease of solving 
multiple-choice questions than open-ended questions, as indicated by the overall 
higher success rates for the former. By this reasoning, the fluency effect and task 
difficulty may have independently generated the observed pattern of confidence 
ratings for the open-ended and multiple-choice tasks, respectively, rather than blind 
utilization of the same heuristic cue.  
Topolinski and Reber (2010), using Method C, provide even more convincing 
evidence for the role of fluency, operationalized by response time, in metacognitive 
judgments. They first presented to participants each problem, and then presented a 
potential answer – the target stimulus – after either a very short or a slightly longer 
delay (the short and long delays differed by 50 to 300 milliseconds). Participants had 
to judge whether the presented answer was the correct solution for the problem. For 
both correct and incorrect candidates, faster-appearing solutions were more 
frequently judged as being correct than those presented after a longer delay. The 
results were replicated with three different types of problem-solving tasks, showing 
the robustness of the phenomenon. Thus, this procedure rules out alternative 
explanations based on task difficulty as the source for the association between time 
and metacognitive judgment. 
The studies just described are concerned with processing fluency, 
operationalized as response time. Thompson, Prowse Turner et al. (2013) examined 
another type of fluency: perceptual fluency, operationalized as font readability. Here, 
fonts were manipulated to be easier or harder to read, while the task and items 
remained the same; thus, this study also employs Method C. Thompson et al. found 
that font readability affected neither participants' judgments nor their performance 
(see Meyer et al., 2015, for a meta-analysis). The important contribution in this case 
is the distinction between types of fluency: response time, interpreted as processing 
fluency, was negatively correlated with both judgments and performance, while font 
readability, interpreted as perceptual fluency, was not correlated with either.  
Two studies demonstrate how to transfer data gathered with less-convincing 
task designs to Method C, which yields more-convincing evidence, using a data 
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analysis approach. Markovits, Thompson, and Brisson (2015) compared deductive 
reasoning tasks phrased abstractly, using nonsensical terms (e.g., "If someone glebs, 
then they are brandup"), to the same problems couched in phrasing that was logically 
equivalent but concrete, using familiar objects and terms (e.g., "If someone cuts their 
finger, the finger will bleed"). Participants were then given a premise (e.g., "A person 
is brandup") and a set of conclusions (e.g., "The person glebs"), and asked whether 
the presented conclusions followed logically from the information given. Markovits 
et al. examined the effect of concreteness on judgments of solvability and final 
confidence. Because their manipulation changed the task stimuli, the study design 
was based on Method B. However, during their data analysis Markovits et al. 
controlled for differences in the accuracy of respondents' reasoning (i.e., whether 
their answers were logically correct), and found that above and beyond accuracy, 
final confidence was higher for the concrete versions of the problems than for the 
abstract versions. Thus, this study provides convincing evidence that concreteness 
(or familiarity) underlies judgments regardless of success in the task (see also 
Bajšanski et al., in press).  
Ackerman and Zalmanov (2012) also controlled for accuracy in a second study 
reported in the paper described above. They used CRA problems, which generate a 
pattern of confidence that seems to be highly reliable – both confidence and accuracy 
drop as more time was invested in solving a problem (Figure 3, Panel a). To 
transform this Method A study into a more convincing Method C study, they divided 
the results data into correct and wrong solutions. This breakdown made time non-
predictive of accuracy. After the breakdown, they still found negative time–
confidence relationships independently for correct and wrong solutions (Figure 3, 
Panel b). 
 
Figure 3. Confidence and probability of correct solution in a 30-item test with compound 
remote associates. Panel a: Overall pattern of results. Panel b: Breakdown of the same data 
into correct and incorrect solutions. Adapted from Ackerman and Zalmanov (2012). 
Ackerman, R.: 




Identifying the heuristic cues that underlie metacognitive judgments is the heart 
of metacognition as a scientific discipline, and in particular the meta-reasoning 
research domain. The methodological pitfalls reviewed in this paper make such 
research challenging. Through this paper I hope to help readers read the existing 
metacognitive literature more critically, and to support the design of high-quality 
research programs aimed at identifying and illuminating the heuristic cues that 
underlie meta-reasoning judgments. In particular, identifying heuristic cues allows 
us to expose conditions that may bias people's effort regulation – a necessary prelude 
to identifying conditions that support better performance in terms of both accuracy 
of results and efficient time management and guiding improvement attempts.  
Cross-domain fertilization is also of high importance. A clear gap in the meta-
reasoning literature is that although there are well-established methods for improving 
problem solving through educational support (e.g., see Frank, Simper, & Kaupp, 
2018; Sweller, Merriënboer, & Paas, in press; Thibaut et al., 2018, for reviews), we 
do not yet understand how these methods affect metacognitive judgments in general 
and cue utilization in particular. For instance, problem solving can be improved when 
solvers accrue experience working with examples, and under some conditions this 
reduces overconfidence (Baars, van Gog, de Bruin, & Paas, 2014). From a 
metacognitive perspective, it is important to know whether this reduction in 
overconfidence is mediated by improved performance which is not reflected in 
confidence ratings; by a global decrease in confidence leading to an increase in 
invested effort; or by increased sensitivity to reliable cues that can be generalized to 
other contexts. Identifying the heuristic cues that people utilize spontaneously and 
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